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ARTICLES
THEORIZING RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
INVESTOR STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
SYSTEM
KRISTEN BOON†
INTRODUCTION
The Investor-State Dispute System (“ISDS”) permits
investors to sue states when their investments are injured.1 The
system was designed to protect investors and impose
responsibilities on states; it is uncontroversial to say that the ISDS
system is one-sided.2 But a chorus of voices is now asking: should
investors have responsibilities too?3 The narrative is one of
†
Full Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. Thanks to Katherine
Comly, Alex Corson, and Jacob Kenter for research assistance. Thanks to Julian
Arato, Nathalie Bernasconi, Harlan Cohen, Jeff Dunoff, Benton Heath, Lise Johnson,
Mark Luz, David Bigge Aniruddha Rajput, Ingo Venzke, and Martin Vestergen for
very helpful comments. I received useful feedback at the ASIL International
Economic Law conference at the McGill Faculty of Law, the Legal Theory Workshop
at Pluricourts, Oslo, the St. John’s Colloquium on International and Comparative
Law, and the ESIL Conference on Socially Responsible Investing at Cattolica
University, Lisbon.
1
In order to sue, the host and home states must be party to an applicable
investment treaty, and the claimant must meet the definition of investor. See 2012
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YY46-QWUK] (last visited May 25, 2022).
2
James Crawford, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, 24 ARB. INT’L
351, 364 (2008) (“[T]he treaty commitments of the host State towards the investor are
unilateral, and . . . the agreement to arbitrate, though it incorporates by reference the
jurisdictional requirements of the BIT, does not incorporate its substantive provisions
nor does it make them applicable bilaterally.”). See also Howard Mann, The Right of
States to Regulate and International Investment Law, INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., 2,
https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/22577605/the-right-of-states-to-regulate-andinternational-investment-law [https://perma.cc/ULL8-7XJG] (last visited May 25, 2022)
(“IIAs have become a charter of rights for foreign investors . . . .”); ALTERNATIVE VISIONS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH 116 (C.L. Lim ed., Cambridge University Press
2016) (“States assume wide-ranging responsibilities under investment treaties.”);
Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1 144, Award (Dec. 7, 2011),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0723.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K3Y2-FN6J].
3
For a multi-voiced assessment of investor responsibility, see James Gathii &
Sergio Puig, Introduction to the Symposium on Investor Responsibility: The Next
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injustice, driven by the perception that states have signed on to a
system that has left them with large financial exposure to
investors. 4 This viewpoint has been reinforced, in the eyes of
some, by the influence of big business, and by state losses on
sensitive matters of public policy, particularly in matters of health,
human rights, and the environment.5 Perhaps unsurprisingly,
there is growing interest in exploring how investment law can be
used not simply to protect investors, but also to address the
grievances of all parties affected by investments in a more
equitable manner.6
Frontier in International Investment Law, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 1, 1 (2019); Kate
Miles, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Conflict, Convergence, and Future
Directions, in 7 EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. 273, 273 (Marc Bungenberg et al. eds.,
2016); Stephan W. Schill, In Defense of International Investment Law, in 7 EUR. Y.B.
INT’L ECON. L. 309 (Marc Bungenberg et al. eds., 2016); Int’l Labour Organization
[ILO], Rafael Peels et al., Corporate Social Responsibility in International Trade and
Investment Agreements: Implications for States, Businesses, and Workers, at 18, ILO
Research Paper No. 13, April 2016, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--dgreports/---inst/documents/publication/wcms_476193.pdf [https://perma.cc/4P4T4QJK]; Wolfgang Alschner & Elisabeth Tuerk, The Role of International Investment
Agreements in Fostering Sustainable Development, in INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVES 217–31 (Freya Baetens ed.,
2013).
4
See generally Steven R. Ratner, Survey Article: Global Investment Rules as a
Site for Moral Inquiry, 27 J. POL. PHIL. 107 (2019). See also KATE MILES, THE
ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE
SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL 133–34 (2013); Nitish Monebhurrun, Essay on Unequal
Treaties and Modernity Through the Example of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 11
BRAZILIAN J. INT’L L. 203, 204 (2014).
5
See, e.g., Adam H. Bradlow, Human Rights Impact Litigation in ISDS: A
Proposal for Enabling Private Parties to Bring Human Rights Claims Through
Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 355, 356 (2017)
(discussing how Ethyl Corp. v. Gov’t of Canada demonstrates a private company’s
ability to stymie human rights through ISDS mechanisms (Ethyl Corp. v. Gov’t of
Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 5 (June 24, 1998), 38 I.L.M. 708–31 (1999),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0300_0.pdf)). However,
there are counterexamples, where major corporations have lost to host states. See,
e.g., Sergio Puig & Anton Strezhnev, The David Effect and ISDS, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L.
731, 731–33 (2017) (discussing Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of
Australia, no. 2012-12 PCA Case Repository ¶¶ 7.15–7.17 (Nov. 12, 2012),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0665.pdf).
6
The commentary to the model SADC treaty is revelatory with regards to this
perception:
[T]here have been several instances where arbitral tribunals have
examined the preamble of a given treaty and found only references to the
promotion of investment and the provision of investor rights under the
treaty. As a result, the preamble has been held to establish a presumption
that the sole purpose of the treaty is the protection of the investor in order,
presumably, to attract higher levels of investment. This has led to several
instances where arbitrators have specifically held that this creates a

2021]

RESPONSIBILITY IN THE INVESTOR STATE

255

This Article seeks to clarify why, where, and how obligations
on investors are emerging in the international dispute resolution
system. It maps what “responsibilities” means in ISDS and
distinguishes such responsibilities from burdens, obligations,
accountability, and Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”). In
addition, it explores those to whom investor responsibilities are
owed, including host states and specially affected groups.
Although there are only two parties to each dispute, there are
many duty holders and constituencies in investor-state
arbitration. The analysis in this Article demonstrates that the
most common way of imposing obligations on investors is actually
to burden an investor’s ability to access ISDS. Drawing from
relational contract theory, this Article argues that relational
responsibility and home state responsibility are more valuable
lenses through which to think systematically about the
responsibilities of non-state actors.
I. MAPPING RESPONSIBILITY
The ISDS system permits investors to sue states for the
violation of certain treaty protections, but not the converse.7
International investment agreements (“IIAs”), including Bilateral
Investment Treaties (“BITs”), Multilateral Investment Treaties
(“MITs”), and Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) with Investor
Protection Provisions vary in their terms, but the theory has
always been that, in exchange for encouraging cross-border
investment activities that ultimately spur economic growth,8
presumption in favour of broader over narrower rights for the investor,
fewer and more limited rights for government regulatory activity in
relation to an investment, and an overall presumption of investor-friendly
interpretations.
SOUTH AFR. DEV. CMTY., SADC MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY TEMPLATE
WITH COMMENTARY 5 (2012) [hereinafter SADC MODEL BIT], https://www.iisd.org
/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4YZ5-RQLE].
7
Investment treaties do not generally permit states to initiate suit, with an
exception for counterclaims as discussed infra notes 161–70. But see Eric De
Brabandere, (Re)Calibration, Standard-Setting and the Shaping of Investment Law
and Arbitration, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2607, 2612–13 (2018) (noting that the objectives of
IIAs are typically the promotion and protection of investments—many IIA’s are
called “Protection Agreements”).
8
See, e.g., Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties
Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, LSE RSCH. ONLINE 1, 1
(2005); Lisa Sachs & Lise Johnson, Investment Treaties, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement and Inequality: How International Rules and Institutions Can Exacerbate
Domestic Disparities 2 (Columbia Ctr. on Sustainable Inv., Working Paper, 2019),
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investors must be given special protections.9 An analogy can be
drawn to the field of human rights advocacy: individuals can sue
the state for human rights violations, but the converse is not
true.10 Although the odd proposal has been made to “flip” the
system, and permit states or other interest groups to sue investors,
this idea remains an outlier.11 The one-sided nature of both
systems is firmly entrenched: they are meant to protect
individuals and corporations against state power.
The idea of “responsibility” is a fundamental one in
international law,12 but the conversation about investor
responsibilities maps onto existing frameworks only in part. For
states, the concept of responsibility is highly developed: if a host
state breaches a provision of a BIT to which it is a party, it may be
found responsible under the Articles of State Responsibility on
Internationally Wrongful Acts (“ARSIWA”) and incur an

https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1074&context=sust
ainable_investment_staffpubs [https://perma.cc/AM64-MWT3].
9
See JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 97 n.177 (Hague Academy of International Law 2011)
(citing DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 26,
30 (2007)); UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1–2 (2009), http://unctad.org/en/docs/
diaeia20095_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH69-C8HM].
10
However, an important difference exists between the human rights and
international investment systems: the requirement to exhaust local remedies. This
rule limits a state’s exposure to an international suit because it gives it an
opportunity to cure the problem or provide a remedy at the domestic level first. See,
e.g., Sachs & Johnson, supra note 8, at 6; see also Kathryn Gordon et al., Investors
Rights and Human Rights—Interactions Under Investment Treaty Law, LSE HUM.
RTS. (Sept. 22, 2014), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/investment-and-human-rights/portfolioitems/investors-rights-and-human-rights-interactions-under-investment-treaty-lawby-kathryn-gordon-joachim-pohl-and-marie-bouchard/ [https://perma.cc/3MQE5TKW] (arguing that the right to be free from arbitrary deprivation of property and
to equal protection under the law is similar in human rights and investment law);
Gathii & Puig, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that human rights systems are also unable
to check misconduct by business actors).
11
See, e.g., DISCUSSION PAPER: A NEW, CLIMATE-FRIENDLY APPROACH TO TRADE,
SIERRA CLUB 6 (2016), https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/uploadswysiwig/climate-friendly-trade-model.pdf [https://perma.cc/EV4X-EULH] (proposing a
new model that would allow public interest groups and communities to initiate dispute
settlement against investors who fail to comply with new obligations as well as give
governments the power to enforce these obligations in domestic courts). See also infra
notes 161–72 and accompanying text (discussing counterclaims).
12
The Responsibility of States, ENCYC. BRITTANICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-law/States-in-international-law
[https://perma.cc/3FSU-YLA7] (last visited May 25, 2022).
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obligation to make full reparations.13 As the commentaries note:
“for the purposes of these articles, international responsibility
results exclusively from a wrongful act contrary to international
law.”14 The breach of investment treaties, customary international
law standards, or investment contracts can trigger such
responsibility.15 In addition, secondary rules are applied to
determine whether conduct can be attributed to a state; whether
the financial obligations of states should be limited where an
investor is found to be contributorily negligent; or whether
excuses, such as “necessity,” are proven.16
However, the ARSIWA are limited to state responsibility, and
leave aside the responsibility of other non-state actors without
prejudice.17 While the International Law Commission (“ILC”)
produced articles on the Responsibility of International
Organizations that were also commended to states by the General
Assembly, their status remains open to debate.18 Individual
responsibility in the criminal sphere has developed dramatically
through the establishment of international criminal courts,19 but
recognition that the law imposes obligations on individuals to
refrain from certain international crimes has not been extended to

13

See JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 101
(Cambridge University Press 2013); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, Rep.
on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 119 (2001) [hereinafter
RWISA], https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_
2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ7R-CAHB]. See generally U.N. Secretary-General,
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Compilation of Decisions
of International Courts, Tribunals, and Other Bodies, U.N. Doc A/71/80 (April 21,
2016) [hereinafter ARSIWA]. Arbitral tribunals are the institutions that cite to the
Articles on State Responsibility most frequently.
14
See RWISA, supra note 13, at 32.
15
For a discussion on investment contracts, see generally Jean Ho, The Creation
of Elusive Investor Responsibility, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 10 (2019).
16
See Robert D. Sloane, On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State
Responsibility, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 447, 491–93 (2012).
17
ARSIWA, supra note 13, at Art. 58.
18
See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of
International Organizations, Rep. of the on the Work of its Sixty Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/66/10 (2011); see also Mirka Möldner, Responsibility of International
Organizations–Introducing the ILC’s DARIO, 16 MAX PLANCK UNYB, 281, 327
(2012) (noting the embryonic stage of DARIO).
19
Edoardo Greppi, The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under
International Law, 81 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 531, 542–43 (1999).
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the imposition of responsibility on other non-state actors
generally.20
Although the outcry for investor responsibilities has
intensified, the idea is not new.21 The issue was famously raised
in the 2007 Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of Congo annulment
award, a case involving the alleged expropriation of a law firm in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the International
Center on Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) tribunal
controversially held that the practice of law did not make a
“contribution to the economic development of the host State”22 and
hence was not a qualified “investment.”23 Here, the concept of
investor responsibility was folded into the definition of investment
itself by requiring an investor to support the host state’s economic
development.24 Since then, a new generation of investment
treaties, reform efforts at ICSID and UNCITRAL, and
developments in the neighboring fields of CSR25 and business and

20
Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 452, 467 (2001) [hereinafter Corporations and Human
Rights].
21
See, e.g., id. at 466–67.
22
Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7,
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Award, ¶ 30 (Nov. 1, 2006). The
tribunal used the traditional Salini conditions for the definition of investment:
“contributions,” “certain duration” and “a participation in the risk,” while
reasserting the importance of this fourth principle of economic development. Id. ¶
27; Walid Ben Hamida, Two Nebulous ICSID Features: The Notion of Investment
and the Scope of Annulment Control—Ad Hoc Committee’s Decision in Patrick
Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of Congo, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 287, 290 (2007) (detailling
the conditions from Salini v. Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of
Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 23, 2001)). For
commentary, see generally Hamida, supra. See also Malaysian Historical Salvors
Sdn. Bhd. v. The Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on
the Application for Annulment, ¶ 16 (2009).
23
See, e.g., Omar E. García-Bolívar, Defining an ICSID Investment: Why
Economic Development Should be the Core Element, INT’L. INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
(Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/defining-an-icsid-investmentwhy-economic-development-should-be-the-core-element/ [https://perma.cc/3GSG73FE] (arguing for the inclusion of the “economic development” factor). Cf. Quiborax
S.A. v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 220 (Sept. 27, 2007) (refusing to require economic development to
obtain arbitral jurisdiction).
24
See generally Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application
for Annulment of the Award.
25
CSR has been defined as a
[C]ontainer concept that entails various dimensions, amongst others, the
development of codes of conduct and the establishment of monitoring
mechanisms to review compliance with these, due diligence with regard to
sustainable development impacts of supply chains activities, revision of
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human rights (“BHR”)26 have moved the needle on what can and
should be expected of investors in exchange for their right to sue.
Today, companies might be expected to engage in environmentally
sound practices, promote human rights, or contribute to
sustainable development to even be considered an “investor.”27
Thus, the slow march toward investor responsibilities has begun.
The use of the word “responsibility,” however, tends to
obscure, rather than clarify, developments in the highly
decentralized system of investor-state arbitration. Rather than
reflecting the international concept of legal responsibility, which
applies to the consequences flowing from a state’s wrongful act,28
proposals for investor responsibilities are connected with
particular values. These include:29
• ensuring equality of parties before the law;
• balancing private rights with public power;
• providing a market advantage to the “right sort” of investor—
that is, investors that contribute to sustainable development;

purchasing and pricing practices . . . or cooperation activities to improve
the capacity of suppliers . . . .
Rafael Peels et al., Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in International Trade and
Investment Agreements: Implications for States, Businesses and Workers, THE GLOB. LAB.
UNIV. 3 (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.global-labour-university.org/fileadmin
/GLU_conference_2015/papers/Peels_et_al.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JBR-MWS3]. See also
Mark Anner et al., Toward Joint Liability in Global Supply Chains: Addressing the Root
Causes of Labor Violations in International Subcontracting Networks, 35 COMP. LAB. L.
POL. J. 1, 2 (2013).
26
See Anil Yilmaz-Vastardis, Is International Investment Law Moving the Ball
Forward on IHRL Obligations for Business Enterprises?, EJIL: TALK (May 15,
2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/is-international-investment-law-moving-the-ballforward-on-ihrl-obligations-for-business-enterprises/ [https://perma.cc/U23A-PTJD].
In CSR, the emphasis is on decision-making by the companies themselves,
not on regulation of their activities by the State or legal
liability. . . . Instead, BHR assesses corporate behavior in the light of
generally accepted human rights standards enshrined in fundamental
international treaties, and is more focused on holding companies
accountable for harm rather than on positive recognition of the role which a
business can play in advocating and protecting human rights.
Valeriia Poiedynok, “Corporate Social Responsibility” and “Business and Human
Rights”: Correlation of Concepts, 8 L. UKR. 132, 144 (2019) (Ukr.).
27
See generally Robert G. Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution,
HARV. BUS. REV. (May–June 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/05/the-investor-revolution
[https://perma.cc/VDG9-A4VL]; BETTINA REINBOTH & NIKOLAJ HALKJAER
PEDERSEN, PRINCIPLES FOR RESP. INV., WHY AND HOW INVESTORS SHOULD ACT ON
HUMAN RIGHTS (2020), https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=11953
[https://perma.cc/U4HZ-HTY5].
28
See discussion on ARSIWA, supra note 13.
29
Id.
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• decreasing frivolous cases and making the adjudication
process more efficient;
• ensuring the integrity of the international arbitral process;
• promoting transparency;
• vindicating the rights and interests of affected third parties;
• increasing avenues for access to justice;
• efficiently deterring violations of economic and social rights by
private actors; and
• promoting the domestic rule of law.

While some of these values may be considered moral or social
responsibilities, few fit into traditional categories of legal
responsibilities.
This disconnect is due in part to the fact that as non-state
actors, investors do not retain “personhood” in the traditional
sense. However, the status quo is controversial: Patrick Dunberry
and Érik Labelle-Eastaugh have argued that corporate investors
should be considered subjects because modern investment treaties
give them rights and the possibility of commencing direct claims
against a state before an international tribunal.30 Moreover, it has
also been argued that the preoccupation with state responsibility
has led to the over-protection of businesses.31 Investors—typically
corporations—do not have legal personality on the international
plane like states or international organizations (“IOs”), and
therefore, their responsibility has been predominantly regulated
by national laws.32 Certainly investors that are owned or
controlled by states are brought under the umbrella of state
responsibility through the rules of attribution;33 however, much, if
30

See Patrick Dumberry & Érik Labelle-Eastaugh, Non-state Actors in
International Investment Law: The Legal Personality of Corporations and NGOs in
the Context of Investor–State Arbitration, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 360, 362–66 (Jean d’Aspremont ed., 2011). See also Jean d’Aspremont,
Introduction: Non-State Actors in International Law: Oscillating Between Concepts
and Dynamics, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, MULTIPLE
PERSPECTIVE ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 2 (Jean d’Aspremont
ed., 2011) (“A preliminary conceptual difficulty: the impossibility of a formal
ascertainment of authors and addressees of international legal rules.”); Edith Brown
Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 96 AM. J. INT’L L.
798, 812–16 (2002).
31
Gathii & Puig, supra note 3, at 1.
32
See generally PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE
LAW (2d ed. 2007).
33
The ICJ held that the conduct of a private actor can be attributed to the state
when it is performed by an agent or organ of the state, acting under the state’s
direction or control, performing “elements of the governmental authority,” or
adopted by the state. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the
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not most, corporate activity falls outside the scope of the
traditional framework of state responsibility.34 This has stymied
a move away from the statuses of particular actors towards the
functions they play.35 The reality is that there are multiple
constituencies involved in investments. The diagram below depicts
the relationships between the investor, the body politic, the home
state⎯the state in which the investor is domiciled⎯and the host
state⎯the state in which the investment takes place.

International Treaties Addressing
Human Rights, Trade & Investment, and
Other Community Interests

Figure 1: Relations in the International Investment Regime36

Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. &
Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 414 (Feb. 26) (finding that articles 4
and 8 of the Articles codify customary international law).
34
See Rachel Brewster & Philip J. Stern, Introduction to the Proceedings of the
Seminar on Corporations and International Law, 28 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 413,
413 (2018) (noting that corporations are “jurisdictionally ambiguous and spatially
diffuse”).
35
See generally Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Legal Personality, 11 IUS
GENTIUM 35 (2005); see also Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174, 178–88 (Apr. 11) (discussing the
“requirements of international life”); see also Prosecutor v. New T.V. S.A.L., Case
No. STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning
Personal Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings, ¶ 80 (Oct. 2, 2014).
36
This Diagram was inspired by Prof. Eva van der Zee’s presentation at the
ESIL Conference on Socially Responsible Investing at the Universita Cattolica,
Lisbon (slide on file with author).
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Modern treaties rarely place direct obligations on investors,
rather they make hortatory and non-binding references in the
treaty preambles to CSR and goals of sustainable development or
environmental protection. However, these treaties are largely
devoted to protecting investors rather than placing obligations on
them.37 Some recent treaties, such as the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”), have moved the
conversation forward by limiting investor access to ISDS if there
is “fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, corruption, or
conduct amounting to an abuse of process.”38 However, this
provision applies only to the establishment phase and not to later
conduct.39 Despite the rhetoric of investor responsibilities, the
trend is to limit access to ISDS rather than to impose
“responsibilities.”40 As a result, the ARSIWA framework has not
meaningfully advanced the discussion about the content or
consequences of a breach of so-called investor responsibilities.
Two other types of responsibility are thus important to
explore: the first of which, Relational Responsibility, looks at
relations beyond the investor and the host state to incorporate the
long term relationship between body politic of the host state, the
investor, and specially affected communities—such as, for
example, indigenous groups.41 This view of responsibility both
expands the set of relevant actors and suggests that a broader set
of responsibilities than those owed by the host state to the investor

37
See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Sustainable Development and International
Investment Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT AND INVESTMENT LAW
38, 38 (Kate Miles ed., 2019).
38
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement art. 8.18, Can.-European
Union, Oct. 30, 2016, GOV’T OF CAN. [hereinafter CETA],
https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/08.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/XG34NPQS] (“For greater certainty, an investor may not submit a claim under this
Section if the investment has been made through fraudulent misrepresentation,
concealment, corruption, or conduct amounting to an abuse of process.”).
39
Id.
40
Lian-Ying Tan & Amal Bouchenaki, Limiting Investor Access to Investment
Arbitration: A Solution without a Problem?, in RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: JOURNEYS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 250, 308 (Jean E.
Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
41
Valentina Vadi, Natural Resources and Indigenous Cultural Heritage in
International Investment Law and Arbitration, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 464, 464 (Kate Miles ed.,
2019) (“Many of the estimated 370 million indigenous peoples around the world have
lost, or are under imminent threat of losing, their ancestral lands because of the
exploitation of natural resources.”).
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are required.42 Relational Responsibility takes a holistic approach
to responsibilities, both local and global, and moves beyond an
inter-partes model in which the sole or primary focus is on the
litigating parties.
In contrast, Home State Responsibility increases the focus on
the responsibility of the state of incorporation of the investor,
particularly with regards to investor oversight. In the inception of
the investor-state system, Home State Responsibility was never
considered.43 Today, however, legislation has become a common
tool for states to impose greater regulation on corporations
operating abroad and spur changes in private behavior.44
Professor Andrea Bjorklund observes that home states have been
reluctant to impose obligations on investors acting abroad because
it effectively requires states themselves to ensure they have a
strong domestic law framework to hold investors accountable.45
This same reluctance may carry over to the UN Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights, and its hesitant approach to
extraterritorial jurisdiction.46
The Parts that follow outline the sources and dynamics of
current efforts to introduce investor obligations into the ISDS
system, while developing the alternative lenses of Relational and
Home State Responsibility.
II. SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS: TREATIES, DOMESTIC LAW,
PROCEDURAL RULES
A prevalent way in which the asymmetry between investors
and states in investment protection agreements is being addressed
is by redefining key provisions in treaties. A recent example of
this is the elimination or redefinition of the Fair and Equitable
Treatment (“FET”) clause in recent treaties, which has limited the
types of injury that can trigger ISDS claims.47 As discussed below,
42

See id. at 464–65.
See Genevieve LeBaron & Andreas Rühmkorf, Steering CSR Through Home
State Regulation: A Comparison of the Impact of the UK Bribery Act and Modern
Slavery Act on Global Supply Chain Governance, 8 GLOB. POL’Y 15, 15 (2017) (U.K.).
44
See id. at 17.
45
Bjorklund, supra note 37, at 52.
46
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS “PROTECT,
RESPECT AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK 3 (2011) [hereinafter UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES],
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HP94-PJ96].
47
Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Investment Treaties Over Time – Treaty
Practice and Interpretation in a Changing World 12, 37–38 (OECD Publ’g, Working
43
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the definition of “investment” itself can have a large impact on
whether a particular cross-border transaction can trigger an ITA
claim because it will determine which foreign capital flows are
covered.48 However, the narrowing of substantive protections does
not correspond with an affirmative obligation or responsibility, as
such, but rather with the imposition of conditions of access. In
other words, limiting access to arbitration rather than imposing
direct obligations has been a prevalent strategy for handling
investor responsibilities.
Some groundbreaking new model treaties are, however,
exploring the direct responsibility framework, including the model
BIT by the South African Development Community (SADC),49 the
India Model BIT,50 the Morocco-Nigeria BIT,51 and the Pacific
Alliance.52 Although none are yet in force at the time of this

Paper no. 2015/02, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP2015-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/84FD-WU3L]. See generally Katarina Chovancová,
The Fair and Equitable Treatment and its Current Status in International
Investment Law, 6 Y.B. INT’L ARB. & ADR 171, 179 (2019).
48
See Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7,
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Award, ¶ 38 (Nov. 1, 2006).
Controversially, the annulment tribunal focused on the fourth element of the Salini
test: contribution to the economic development of the host state, and determined
that Mitchell’s legal services were the “investment’’ to be evaluated under the
convention and not the economic investment of establishing a practice in the DRC.
Id. ¶ 25. Subsequently, tribunals have expressed concern about measuring this
requirement. See Quiborax S.A. v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 218–21 (Sept. 27, 2007) (citing LESI S.p.A. v.
People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 72 (July 12, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0456_0.pdf).
49
See SADC MODEL BIT, supra note 6, at 8.
50
INDIA DEP’T ECON. AFF., MODEL TEXT FOR THE INDIAN BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATY (Jan. 14, 2016) [hereinafter INDIAN MODEL BIT], https://www.mygov.in/sites
/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Inv
estment%20Treaty.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA7Q-WYWH].
51
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Reciprocal Investment
Promotion and Protection Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of
Morocco and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Morocco-Nigeria,
Dec. 3, 2016 [hereinafter Morocco-Nigeria BIT], https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org
/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5409/download
[https://perma.cc/R7FC-ENHR].
52
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership art.
28.23, Feb. 3, 2016, N.Z. FOREIGN AFF. AND TRADE [hereinafter Pacific Alliance],
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-agreements/CPTPP/Comprehensive-andProgressive-Agreement-for-Trans-Pacific-Partnership-CPTPP-English.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E3G9-Q2MA].
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Obligations that Limit the Primary Obligation of the State by
Treaty: Narrowing the Definition of Investor & Investment

The most direct way to impose responsibilities on investors is
through the primary rules, particularly defined treaty terms.
There are three main models of the investment definition, each of
which impacts access to ISDS: the “open-ended” asset-based
definition characteristic of old-generation treaties, which defines
an investment as “every kind of asset” and gives tribunals great
discretion to determine what constitutes an investment because it
includes a non-exclusive list of assets that may qualify;54 the
“closed” asset-based model, which often lists the “commitment of
capital or other resources” alongside other characteristics, such as
“expectation of profit” and assumption of risk;55 and the most
restrictive, the “enterprise-based” definition,56 which includes only
instruments of an enterprise “established or acquired in
accordance with the laws of the Host State.”57 Unsurprisingly,
new model BITs that seek to rebalance investor responsibilities
have advocated the narrower definitions of investment.58

53

See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
The open-ended definition has been the subject of criticism, on the basis that “it
allows for the most expansive interpretation by tribunals of what that definition
encompasses, since the list that follows is merely indicative. This definition is therefore
the least predictable for host states. This increases the risks of being sued.” NATHALIE
BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER & HOWARD MANN, INT’L. INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., A
RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S DECEMBER 2013 DOCUMENT “INVESTMENT
PROVISIONS IN THE EU-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CETA)” 12 (2014),
https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/reponse_eu_ceta.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2ANN-LWFC].
55
See MAHNAZ MALIK, INT’L. INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., BULLETIN #1:
DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 3–14
(2009), iisd.org/system/files/publications/best_practices_bulletin_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V3BP-5WZS]. This model provides an exhaustive list of situations
that constitute an investment. See BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER & MANN, supra note
54, at 11.
56
See SADC MODEL BIT, supra note 6, at 9.
57
Id.
58
The proposed definition in SADC Article 2 is as follows:
Investment means an enterprise within the territory of one State Party
established, acquired or expanded by an investor of the other State Party,
including through the constitution, maintenance or acquisition of a
juridical person or the acquisition of shares, debentures or other ownership
instruments of such an enterprise, provided that the enterprise is
established or acquired in accordance with the laws of the Host State[; and
54
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Importantly, the principle behind these narrower definitions
of investment is to balance the private rights of the investor with
the public power of the host state. States are using treaties to
reassert their right to regulate, and by linking the definition of
investment to other goals, for example, treaties are increasingly
making reference to environmental protection and development,59
and CSR.60 However, sometimes these references are in the
preamble, and thus non-binding—as such, they are better viewed
as a normative step towards imposing obligations on non-state
actors via treaties, rather than as responsibilities per se.61
There are differing degrees of obligations in current treaty
practice. The 2019 Netherlands Model BIT provides in Article
seven, Section one, that “[i]nvestors and their investments shall
comply with domestic laws and regulations of the host state,
including laws and regulations on human rights, environmental
protection and labor laws.”62 In contrast, the Canada-Peru FTA is
a more typical example, which states:
[registered] [approved] [recognized] in accordance with the legal
requirements of the Host State].
Id. (emphasis added). Note, however, that this treaty is not binding but rather
serves as a text that can be used in negotiations. See also INDIAN MODEL BIT, supra
note 50 (Art. 1.6 of India’s new model BIT also provides that “ ‘Investment’ means an
Enterprise in the Host State, constituted, organised and operated in compliance with
the Law of the Host State and owned or controlled in good faith by an Investor.”).
See generally Aniruddha Rajput, Protection of Foreign Investment in India and
International Rule of Law: Rise or Decline? (KFG, Working Paper No. 10, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3135261. See also Huan Qi, The Definition of Investment
and its Development: for the Reference of the Future BIT between China and Canada,
45 REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS 541, 553–54 (2011) (Fr.) (providing typical cases such
as Article 1139 of the NAFTA, the 2003 Canada FIPA, and the Mexico Model BIT).
59
See generally Aniruddha Rajput, Defining “Investment”– A Developmental
Perspective, 2 INDIAN J. ARB. L. 12 (2013) (India). See also U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND
DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2018: INVESTMENT AND NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICIES,
at 80, U.N. Sales No. E.18.II.D.4 (2018), https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary
/wir2018_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL5P-3ADJ].
60
See, e.g., Draft Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and for the Promotion
and Protection of Investments, REGJERINGEN.NO (May 2015), https://www.regjeringen.no/co
ntentassets/e47326b61f424d4c9c3d470896492623/draft-model-agreement-english.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X26F-2CCF] (referencing CSR in the preamble).
61
See id.
62
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Netherlands Model Investment
Agreement (Mar. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Netherlands Model Investment Agreement],
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/5832/download [https://perma.cc/QSH4-PHPT] (emphasis added). Similarly, the
Morocco-Nigeria BIT (signed but not yet in force) will require investors to apply,
alongside the host state, the precautionary principle; maintain an environmental
management system and uphold human rights in accordance with core labor and
environmental standards as well as labor and human rights obligations; not engage
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Each Party should encourage enterprises operating within its
territory or subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate
internationally recognized standards of corporate social
responsibility in their internal policies, such as statements of
principle that have been endorsed or are supported by the
Parties. These principles address issues such as labour, the
environment, human rights, community relations and anticorruption.
The Parties remind those enterprises of the
importance of incorporating such corporate social responsibility
standards in their internal policies.63

There is a changing culture with regards to the rights of third
parties against businesses.64
Treaties are, with increasing
frequency, making reference to the non-binding OECD
Guidelines65 and the UN Global Compact,66 and calling on
contracting states to promote compliance with international and
national human rights and environmental standards.67 Moshe
Hirsch reports a gradual increase in references to human rights
in bilateral and multinational treaties and arbitral awards.68
in corruption, meet or exceed national and international standards of corporate
governance; and operate through high levels of corporate governance. See generally
Morocco-Nigeria BIT, supra note 51. For commentary see Tarcisio Gazzini, Nigeria
and Morocco Move Towards a “New Generation” of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
EJIL: TALK! (May 8, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/nigeria-and-morocco-movetowards-a-new-generation-of-bilateral-investment-treaties/ [https://perma.cc/C8ZP4D9C].
63
Free Trade Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru, UNCTAD,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/626/download [https://perma.cc/57AZ-3WUV] (last modified Nov. 28, 2016) (emphasis
added).
64
COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., IMPACTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT REGIME ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE 14–15, 18, 20 (2018),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/CCSI_UNWGBHR_InternationalInve
stmentRegime.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE6Y-3CZK].
65
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment between the
Republic of Austria and the Republic of Tajikistan, Austria-Taj., December 15, 2010,
PERMANENT CT. ARB., https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/Austria-Tajikistan-BIT2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8WR-UMB8] (last visited Sep. 11, 2021).
66
Free Trade Agreement Between the Republic of Colombia and the EFTA States
preamble, November 25, 2008, ORG. AM. STATES, http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/COL_EFT
A/Final_Texts_e/ftacolombia.pdf [https://perma.cc/N23J-4NQV].
67
EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement, Oct. 30, 2008, 2008 O.J.
(L 289) 1. See also CETA, supra note 38 (The preamble “[e]ncourag[es] enterprises
operating within their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to respect
internationally recognised guidelines and principles of corporate social
responsibility, including the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and to
pursue best practices of responsible business conduct.”).
68
Moshe Hirsch, Social Movements, Reframing Investment Relations, and
Enhancing the Application of Human Rights Norms in International Investment
Law, 34 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 127, 130–31 (2021).
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Significantly, the UN Guiding Principles—perhaps the most
influential instrument in the field—has not been directly
referenced by treaties, although it enjoys great support with
regards to the elaboration of corporate responsibility for human
rights abuses and access to justice for victims.69
B.

Obligations Imposed by Domestic Law

1.

Host State

Some host states with strong regulatory environments have
righted perceived imbalances in power by requiring investors to
conform with local laws, pass screening tests, a n d make
commitments with regards to human rights, the environment, and
labor.70 Indeed, domestic laws have imposed “responsibilities” on
investors of both the substantive and procedural kind.71 Because
ICSID Art. 42 permits tribunals to use the law of the contracting
state in the absence of other rules, clauses in treaties that state
the investment must be in accordance with host state law can be
used by respondent states to argue that investments do not qualify
for IIA protection.72 In addition, domestic laws can create a
market advantage for certain kinds of investments, such as those
that contribute to sustainable development goals, thereby giving
host states considerable latitude in how they regulate incoming
investments.73
Elevating the host state has the effect of empowering domestic
jurisdictions to play a larger role in regulating and resolving
investment disputes. It underscores the importance of conforming
with host state law, even when this conformation is not explicitly
required by the treaty. In the 2018 award in Cortec Mining v.
Kenya, for example, the question was whether the claimant
committed a serious violation of host state law when making an
See generally UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46.
See, e.g., Netherlands Model Investment Agreement, supra note 62, at art. 7.
71
Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice
and the Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 361, 388 (2018) (discussing
domestic investment courts).
72
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 42, Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159,
https://heinonline-org.jerome.stjohns.edu/HOL/Page?collection=ustreaties&handle
=hein.ustreaties/ust017001&page=1270&size=2&set_as_cursor=0.
73
U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2020:
INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION BEYOND THE PANDEMIC, at 214, U.N. Sales No.
E.20.II.D.23 (2020), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2020_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CK7P-RUA2].
69
70
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investment by obtaining a mining license without conducting an
environmental impact assessment.74 Denying jurisdiction, the
tribunal wrote:
[T]he Claimants’ failure to comply with the legislature’s
regulatory regime governing the Mrima Hill forest and nature
reserve, and the Claimants’ failure to obtain an EIA
license . . . constituted violations of Kenyan law that, in terms of
international law, warrant the proportionate response of a denial
of treaty protection under the BIT and the ICSID Convention. 75

Investment treaties, such as the SADC Model BIT and the
Indian Model BIT, recommend the exhaustion of local remedies
before initiating arbitration.76 This trend is relatively novel, the
vast majority of investment treaties neither require nor waive the
exhaustion of administrative or judicial remedies before the
initiation of proceedings. However, New Zealand signed sideagreements with countries party to the CPTPP that either
completely restrict access to ISDS, or put conditions on access by,
for example, requiring investors to make written requests for
consultations and negotiations, and resolve the dispute amicably by
non-binding third-party procedures.77 Obligations to comply with
domestic provisions or initiate dispute resolution in domestic
venues first, however, are not properly considered
“responsibilities” as such, but rather encumbrances on an
investor’s right of access.78

74
Cortec Mining Kenya Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/29,
Award ¶ 1 (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw10051.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA6J-TAV2].
75
Id. ¶ 365. See also Lorenzo Cotula & James T. Gathii, Cortec Mining Kenya
Limited, Cortec (Pty) Limited, and Stirling Capital Limited v. Republic of Kenya, 113
AM. J. INT’L L., 574, 574 (2019).
76
See SADC MODEL BIT, supra note 6, at 52, 56–57 (Articles 28.4 and 29.4(b)(ii)
require investors to demonstrate they have exhausted local remedies, rather than
permitting them a “fork-in-the-road.”). See also INDIAN MODEL BIT, supra note 50,
at Art. 14.3.
77
See Pacific Alliance, supra note 52. See also MARTIN DIETRICH BRAUCH, INT’L
INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW: IISD BEST PRACTICES SERIES–JANUARY 2017, at 7–23 (2017),
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-exhaustion-localremedies-law-investment-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/M88H-QLYF].
78
Unlike in property law where encumbrances restrict an owner’s ability to
transfer title to a property or negatively affect its value, here I mean the burdens on
procedural rights of access to particular dispute resolution processes.
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Home State

While host state regulation over investments has increased,
home state regulation of investors operating in cross-border
economic activities has not moved forward to the same degree.
This is because home states typically seek to protect the assets of
their MNE’s investing abroad, and reduce restrictions on foreign
affiliates operating in host countries.79 Indeed, home states have
typically not wanted to assume obligations concerning the
behavior of MNEs.80 Although states have increasingly become
both home and host countries, and hence respondents in
investment disputes, they have become more sensitive to the
various political and economic concerns involving investor
responsibilities.81 This is clearly one of the most important
frontiers in righting asymmetries in investor responsibility.
However, in addition to home state hesitancy about better
regulation, two obstacles remain: first, due to the high thresholds
for attribution under the ARSIWA, the acts of transnational
corporations (“TNCs”) operating abroad are not usually
attributable to home states unless the corporation is a state-owned
entity.82 Second, extraterritorial regulation continues to spark
concerns, despite the considerable interest in the home state
model.83
The beginnings of this direction are apparent in existing
instruments. As Jennifer Zerk notes, The Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (“UNGPs”) take the position that:
“States are not [at present] generally required under international
human rights law to regulate the extraterritorial activities of
businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction.”84

79
Olivier de Schutter, Sovereignty-Plus in the Era of Interdependence: Towards
an International Convention on Combating Human Rights Violations by
Transnational Corporations, in MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW WORK IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DETLEV VAGTS 245, 283 (Pieter H.F. Bekker et al.
eds., 2010).
80
Id. at 273.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 272–73.
83
See Id.; see also SIGRUN SKOGLY, BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS: STATES’
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 66 (2006). For a
critical response, see generally Claire Methven O’Brien, The Home State Duty to
Regulate the Human Rights Impacts of TNCs Abroad: A Rebuttal, 3 BUS. & HUM.
RTS. J. 47 (2018).
84
JENNIFER ZERK, CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES:
TOWARDS A FAIRER AND MORE EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF DOMESTIC LAW REMEDIES 55
(2013), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/
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However, homes states should nevertheless “set out clearly the
expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their
territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout
their operations.”85 The Maastricht Principles go a step further and
provide that States have an obligation to monitor TNCs domiciled in
their jurisdiction and refrain from supporting them whenever they
are involved in human rights violations in the territory of third
states.86 In the same vein, Article 20 of the Morocco-Nigeria BIT
states investors “shall be subject to civil actions for liability in
the judicial process of their home state for the acts or decisions
made in relation to the investment where such acts or decisions
lead to significant damage, personal injuries or loss of life in the
host state.”87
Typically, the state of incorporation is the state most capable
of regulating a corporation because it is closest to the decisionmaking node. That ISDS provided no primary provisions for
home state responsibility in its initial conception was a
substantial oversight, although it was due in part to its
commercial origins.88 Recent literature has emphasized the
obligations of home states to prevent extraterritorial human
rights abuses by TNCs.89 However, even before the thornier
issues regarding the extraterritorial application of treaties are
broached, it is important to indicate that states can choose to
regulate the activities of businesses abroad through domestic
regulation. For example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(“FCPA”) provides that anyone with a certain degree of
connection to the United States can be prosecuted for bribery,
whether committed in the United States or abroad.90

StudyDomesticeLawRemedies.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S38-E3TN].
85
Id.
86
See ETO CONSORTIUM, MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON EXTRATERRITORIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
9 (2013), https://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-navigation/library/maastrichtprinciples/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23 [https://perma.cc/6AWS-K5HP].
See, in particular, principle 11 on the topic of State responsibility. Id. at 7 (“State
responsibility is engaged as a result of conduct attributable to a State, acting
separately or jointly with other States or entities, that constitutes a breach of its
international human rights obligations whether within its territory or
extraterritorially.”).
87
Morocco-Nigeria BIT, supra note 51, at art. 20.
88
See supra notes 7–9, 83–85 and accompanying text.
89
O’Brien, supra note 83, at 51.
90
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a),
78dd-3(a) (2018).
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Responsibilities Towards the Claim: Procedural Rules and
Responsibilities

A third set of obligations can be identified through procedures.
Increasingly, rules in arbitral fora have become an important
source of investor obligations, and these are properly viewed not
as obligations towards the investor or state, but towards the
resolution of the claim itself.91 Rules involving disclosure of thirdparty funding for example, may require investors to reveal certain
facts or backers that illuminate motives and interests in their
cases.92 Similarly, security for cost orders, which can be ordered
by a tribunal in cases where the recovery of a potential claim is at
risk, places certain obligations on claimants and states, in the
event of a counter-claim.93 Like domestic pleading requirements
that burden a plaintiff’s right of access to a courthouse, or impose
certain conditions on access,94 the values behind these reforms
include efficiency, strengthening the legitimacy of the arbitral
process, and tapping into the broader move towards transparency
in investor/state arbitration.95
The concept of responsibilities in ISDS has been employed to
suggest that access to dispute resolution mechanisms under ISDS
should be limited to certain types of investors or require the
absence or presence of certain types of practices.96 In other words,
investors may not be eligible to bring a claim to a particular forum
or even be successful in bringing their claims if they have engaged
in activities like corruption.
In these situations, the label
responsibility is typically not connected to the breach of an international
obligation but is rather connected to limits placed on the use of a

91
See generally Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Annotated Provisional Agenda of
the Fifty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/962 (2019).
92
Brooke Guven & Lise Johnson, The Policy Implications of Third-Party
Funding in Investor-State Dispute Settlement 12 (Columbia Ctr. on Sustainable Inv.,
Working Paper, 2019), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1007&context=sustainable_investment_staffpubs [https://perma.cc/4LAW9YZR].
93
Id. at 40.
94
Alexander A. Reinert, The Burdens of Pleading, 162 U. PA L. REV. 1767, 1768–
69 (2014) (discussing changes to the FRCP).
95
De Brabandere, supra note 7, at 2630 (discussing the Mauritius Convention
and the UNCITRAL rules on Transparency).
96
Stephan Schill, Access to Justice in Investment Dispute Settlement, KLUWER ARB.
BLOG (Feb. 10, 2020), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/02/10/access-tojustice-in-investment-dispute-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/BXY7-CTEZ].
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particular forum.97 World Duty Free Co. v. Kenya illustrates this
scenario.98 Here, a British company built and operated duty-free
shops at airports in Nairobi and Mombassa.99 The contract was
made possible by a $2 million bribe that the company had paid to
the Kenyan president.100 Because the company’s investment had
originated with this corrupt act—contrary to Kenyan law—the
Tribunal found that there could be no basis for a valid claim.101
Tribunals have also denied claims at the jurisdiction stage, on
the merits, and at the damages stage, where investors have acted
illegally.102 Although the reasoning of most awards to date have
not been based on substantive treaty terms, some new treaties
make these doctrines explicit. For example, CETA expressly
provides that an investor cannot submit a claim to arbitration if
its investment
has been
made through
fraudulent
misrepresentation, concealment, corruption, or conduct amounting
to an abuse of process.103
The ISDS system is not alone in placing conditions of access
on investors. Sustainable development funds, political risk
insurance policies, and procurement rules reflect similar
concerns.104 For example, while an investor need not purchase
political risk insurance, certain underwriting conditions must be
met if it chooses to.105 Similarly, in order to earn the label of a
sustainable development fund, investors must demonstrate
practices that comply with the goals of good governance and social
and environmental development.106
Interestingly, Sovereign
97
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See generally World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/7, Award, (Oct. 4, 2006).
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Id. ¶ 62.
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Id. ¶ 66.
101
Id. ¶185.
102
See discussion on unclean hands, infra notes 146–49 and accompanying text.
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CETA, supra note 38, at 53.
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Pammela S. Quinn, Regulation in the Shadows of Private Law, 28 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 327, 342–50 (2018) (discussing the regulatory properties of political
risk insurance).
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The UN Principles for Responsible Investment define responsible investment
as: “an approach to investing that aims to incorporate environmental, social and
governance (ESG) factors into investment decisions to better manage risk and
generate sustainable, long-term” results. Why We’re Here, PRINCIPLES RESPONSIBLE
INV., http://10.unpri.org/why-were-here/ [https://perma.cc/8TV8-P6GZ] (last visited
Aug. 23, 2021).
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Wealth Funds are widely viewed as first movers in this area, and
the Norwegian Pension Fund, in particualr, is raising the bar on
socially responsible investing, given its widespread investment
portfolio, public visibility, long-term horizons, and size.107 Public
procurement processes have likewise developed as alternate
regulatory mechanisms: market incentives have merged with
otherwise voluntary norms.108
The requirements for disclosure of third-party funding is
perhaps the most significant example of new procedural rules that
impose disclosure obligations on investors.109 Due to the sharp
increase in litigation funded by parties who have no pre-existing
interest in the litigation, concerns have been expressed that thirdparty funders like banks, institutional investors, or companies
might gain excessive control over the arbitral process, leading to
frivolous claims and discouragement of settlements.110 Moreover,
the process has also led to conflicts of interest between arbitrators
and third-party funders, due to lack of disclosure.111 As a result,
at the time of writing, the UNCITRAL Working Group III is
considering whether to regulate or prohibit third-party funding
altogether.112
Some arbitrators have also linked the absence of transparency
to decisions reducing costs. In Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Peru, a
107

Xenia Karametaxas, Funding the Future: Sovereign Wealth Funds as
Promoters of Intergenerational Equity, in INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 179, 189–90
(Thomas Cottier et al. ed., 2019).
108
Christopher McCrudden, Corporate Social Responsibility and Public
Procurement 1, 3 (Univ. of Oxford Fac. of L., Working Paper No. 9/2006, 2006),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=899686 [https://perma.cc/6RHESEHM].
109
See generally Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation
Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011). Rupert Jackson defined third party funding as:
“[t]he funding of litigation by a party who has no pre-existing interest in the litigation,
usually on the basis that (i) the funder will be paid out of the proceeds of any amounts
recovered as a consequence of the litigation, often as a percentage of the recovery sum; and
(ii) the funder is not entitled to payment should the claim fail.” RUPERT JACKSON, REVIEW
OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: PRELIMINARY REPORT viii (2009), https://www.judiciary.uk/wpcontent/uploads/JCO/Documents/Guidance/jackson-vol1-low.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y469YGWB].
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Comm. on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of Working Group III (Investor-State
Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/935, ¶ 89 (2018) [hereinafter ISDS Working Group Report].
111
See, e.g., Comm. on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the ICCA-Queen-Mary Task
Force on Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/935, at
82–83 (2018).
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For a discussion of proposed regulations, see generally UNCITRAL, ThirdParty Funding, https://uncitral.un.org/en/thirdpartyfunding [https://perma.cc/347RGR2F] (last visited Oct. 21, 2021).
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case involving the expropriation of a mining project, Philippe
Sands noted in his separate, partially dissenting opinion, that the
claimant was partially responsible for the harms caused, including
the failure to obtain a “social license.”113 Sands also accused the
claimant of subterfuge, noted the claimant’s lack of transparency
with regards to filing for permits and not disclosing its identity,
and concluded damages for the claimant should be reduced due to
its contributions to the social unrest.114 In so doing, he linked a
violation of procedural burdens to a secondary rule of international
law: the availability of compensation.115
Security for costs is also an area where investor
responsibilities are being imposed.116 Broadly speaking, allocation
of costs has come up in various reform contexts because the three
main costs involved in ISDS—arbitrator’s fees, administrative
fees, and representation fees—are estimated to average eighty-two
percent of the total cost of a case.117 Some agreements have used
costs as a method of dissuading investors from bringing spurious
claims. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”), for instance,
allows tribunals to award costs and attorney’s fees in the case of
frivolous claims.118 More significantly, however, are new rules on
security for costs, which make the right of a claimant to proceed
on a claim conditional on provision of partial security to guarantee
the substantive claims in the proceedings.119 For example, the new
Vienna Rules authorize tribunals to order security for costs as an
interim measure if the respondent can show that the

113

Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21,
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Security for costs has also come up in the UNCITRAL Working Groups. See
ISDS Working Group Report, supra note 110, ¶ 92.
117
See, e.g., ISDS Costs–How Much and Who Pays?, ISDS BLOG (Nov. 19, 2015),
http://isdsblog.com/2015/11/19/isds-costs-how-much-and-who-pays/
[https://perma.cc/YAV6-RXDK]; David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, InvestorState Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community 3
(OECD, Working Paper No. 2012/03, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/investment/
investment-policy/WP-2012_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/M635-U4SM].
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Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement art. 9.29.4, Feb. 4, 2016, OFF. OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-TextInvestment.pdf [https://perma.cc/LAJ8-KY2F].
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recoverability of a potential claim for costs is at risk.120 This rule
is extremely important for respondent states that are facing claims
by investors who are at risk of bankruptcy. Moreover, it is a
reform being touted to improve investor-state responsibility by
ensuring “equal access to justice.”121
In the first analysis, therefore, we can identify three sources
of investor obligations:
(1) Responsibilities Imposed by Treaty: For example,
definition of investment, whereby a limited definition is intended
to restrict access to ISDS tribunals;
(2) Responsibilities Imposed by Domestic Law: For example,
national law requirement to conduct an environmental impact
assessment, to consult with particular communities, or to act in
accordance with host state law. This is the key source of Home
State Responsibility;
(3) Responsibilities Imposed as a Result of Procedures: For
example, tribunal-imposed requirement to disclose third-party
funding.122
D. Relational Responsibility
Another set of questions that is relevant in the move towards
investor responsibility, is to whom a particular responsibility is
owed.
One innovation of ISDS has been to extend the
responsibility of the host state to the investor, in that investors
have the right to invoke a treaty breach directly.123 However, the
dispute resolution process can extend far beyond that: the body
politic and specially affected communities such as indigenous
groups may, depending on the nature of the investment and claim,
also have a relationship to the investor.124 The relational lens
takes as its first proposition “that every transaction is embedded
in complex relations between both the parties and between the
120

See, e.g., Rules of Arbitration and Mediation of the Vienna International
Arbitral Center, VIENNA INT’L ARB. CTR., (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.viac.eu/en
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also Lisa Beisteiner, New Vienna Rules: Where do you stand on Security for Costs?,
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parties and the norms of society or the larger body politic.”125 The
preceding discussion has illustrated that it is rare for investment
treaties themselves to specifically identify responsibilities owed to
parties other than the investor.126 Moreover, it is not clear that
the body politic of either the home or host state can properly be
considered an intended third party beneficiary of investment
treaties.127
However, there are opportunities to embed
responsibilities
reflecting
human
rights
obligations,
environmental due diligence, and other types of social
responsibilities in the underlying concession agreements or
investment contracts. This would give voice to a new network of
norms and relationships.
Relational contract theory is a useful vehicle through which to
assess investments because it emphasizes the long term, dynamic
nature of relationships.128 A key tenet of relational contract theory
is that the contracts are not static; rather contracts grow and
change.129 In the context of ISDS specifically, the relational
approach “highlight[s] all the normative and distributive
consequences of foreign investment projects,” such as “the
multiplicity of rights and obligations at stake.”130 In many
instances, “[i]n relational terms, foreign investor rights, states’
right to regulate, and local entitlements are often in tension.”131 In
the classical approach to responsibility, states have
responsibilities towards other states, and it is the breach of those
125
Jared Wessel, Relational Contract Theory and Treaty Interpretation: EndGame Treaties v. Dynamic Obligations, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 149, 152 (2004).
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But see Morocco-Nigeria BIT, supra note 51 (describing a new generation of
investment treaties, such as the Morocco-Nigeria BIT, in which this is not the case).
127
See Wessel, supra note 125, at 152.
128
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obligation stemming from a contract.” Id. at 154. Ian Macneil, one of the key
relational contract theorists, took issue with the classical contract law approach and
emphasis on objective manifestations of assent, and instead argued that contracts
are co-operative. “The first thing to note about contract is the fact that it concerns
social behaviour. . . . The next thing to note is that the kind of social behaviour
involved is co-operative social behaviour, behaviour characterized by willingness and
ability to work with others. . . . contract involves people affirmatively working
together.” IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: INSTRUMENTS FOR SOCIAL COOPERATION,
EAST AFRICA 14 (1968).
129
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. L.
REV. 805, 805 (2000).
130
Nicolás M. Perrone, The “Invisible” Local Communities: Foreign Investor
Obligations, Inclusiveness, and the International Investment Regime, 113 AJIL
UNBOUND 16, 16 (2019).
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obligations that can lead to international responsibility.132 Both
the home state and host state are juridically equal; neither the
investor nor the population of the host state is specifically
considered. However, the ARSIWA are not restricted to bilateral
relationships. As the commentaries make clear: “[t]hey apply to
the whole field of the international obligations of States, whether
the obligation is owed to one or several States, to an individual or
group, or to the international community as a whole.”133
From a relational standpoint, states and investors may have
multiple duties, including to the body politic and to specially
affected groups.134 For example, if a state is found responsible to
another state, a bilateral relation underpins that responsibility.
In some instances, however, such duties may also apply to
corporations. In the well-known Urbaser decision, involving a
water concession agreement in Argentina, the tribunal discussed
the ICESCR and the International Labor Organization (“ILO”)
Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multilateral
Enterprises and Social Policy, and wrote: “the human right for
everyone’s dignity and [the right to] adequate housing and living
conditions are complemented by an obligation on all parts, public
and private parties, not to engage in activity aimed at destroying
such rights.”135 It then went on to distinguish between the duty of
compliance, which falls on states, and the duty of performance
which does not fall on a corporation.136 The tribunal concluded
that: “the investor’s obligation to ensure the population’s access to
water is not based on international law. This obligation is framed
by the legal and regulatory environment under which the investor
is admitted to operate on the basis of the BIT and the host State’s

132
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The human right to water entails an obligation of compliance on the part of
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laws.”137 As such, it acknowledged a relational approach, although
one grounded in treaty and host state law.
Nonetheless, it has also been observed that “arbitrators may
not actually be considering the population of the host state as a
party or actor whose interests and rights are to be taken into
account. Rather, they see the host state government as
representing its population.”138 Consequently, “[t]his conflation
may create a distance that makes the preference in [the] valuation
of investor’s rights even stronger [ ] and . . . permits arbitrators to
shift the issue of responsibility to give effect to the relevant human
rights onto the host state government.”139 Moreover, the human
rights of host-state populations have been addressed only
infrequently, and then framed as aspirational and potential gains,
compared with the rights of investors, which are conceived by
tribunals as endowments that have been lost.140
Where relational responsibilities arise, investors may have a
duty to consult. This derives from the concept of the “social
license” and from certain treaty obligations relevant to indigenous
peoples.141 The duty to consult was an important issue in the
recent Bear Creek case, where Philippe Sands wrote, “[i]t is
blindingly obvious that the viability and success of a project such
as this, located in the community of the Aymara peoples, a group
of interconnected communities, was necessarily dependent on local
support.”142 Making specific emphasis on the applicability of ILO
Convention 169, he then concluded that Article 15 of the
Convention, related to consultation requirements, was an
applicable rule of international law that the Tribunal should have
137
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taken into consideration to determine whether Bear Creek had
“carried out its obligation to give effect to the aspirations of the
Aymara peoples in an appropriate manner.”143 As Jesse Coleman
and others have argued, this decision is emblematic of tensions
between human rights holders, human rights obligations, and
international investment law:
Investors who have failed to meaningfully engage communities,
and even those who have acted in breach of domestic law, have
been awarded considerable sums of money at the expense of
states and their taxpayers—while states have been reprimanded
for not doing enough to protect investors in the context of citizen
protests.144

A number of equitable doctrines reflect the relational
approach to responsibility. For example, the “clean hands”
doctrine provides that “a party to a dispute cannot ask for an
equitable reparation to the other if it is itself in violation of a
principle of equity.”145 The doctrine has been used by states to
have a claim deemed inadmissible or to counter potential liability
in the context of a suit brought by an investor against a state.146 It
does not exist as a matter of treaty law, but rather as an equitable
doctrine applied by arbitral tribunals. Some tribunals have applied
the clean hands doctrine to reject jurisdiction over a dispute, where
the investment is premised upon illegal activity.147 In other
contexts, tribunals have “fined” the investor for bringing a claim
against the state knowing that it was doing so with unclean
143
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hands.148 In other circumstances, tribunals have examined the
merits of the dispute in light of the unclean hands of the investor.
Al-Warraq v. Indonesia employs this strategy: the investor
claimed that the Indonesian bank had unlawfully expropriated
funds surrounding a government bailout.149 Ultimately, the
investor was convicted under Indonesian law of corruption and
money laundering and, as the tribunal noted, was aware of the
expropriation and therefore negligent in supervising the bank’s
funds.150 Similarly, in Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Ecuador, the
tribunal noted the investor’s “own contributory negligent acts and
omissions and unclean hands” in deciding that one of the alleged
violations was partly its fault.151 Here, the tribunal noted that
these were overt actions on behalf of the investor that contributed
to its culpability, calling its actions a “premediated, disguised and
well-funded plan[ ] to take the law into its own hands.”152
Accordingly, the tribunal reduced the amount of damages owed to
the investor.153
Arbitrators have also policed behavior by
allocating costs for arbitrators and lawyers and assigning
institutional fees.154 Nonetheless, not all tribunals have been
willing to read-in investor obligations through reference to
domestic laws or treaty preambles. For example, the panel in
148
See Agata Zwolankiewicz, The Principle of Clean Hands in International
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Fakes v. Turkey stated that whether “an investment might be
‘legal’ or ‘illegal,’ [or] made in ‘good faith’ or not, it nonetheless
remains an investment.”155 The usefulness of judicially applied
doctrines, such as unclean hands, may thus be limited,
particularly for developing countries who do not have the
resources to effectively fight MNCs.156
Counterclaims have also been discussed as a way of
overcoming the deficiencies in the current “all-or-nothing”
approach to the system.157 Many IIAs permit States to assert
counterclaims if they relate to the same subject matter, although
sometimes the claims are excluded by virtue of the relevant
dispute resolution clause.158 Moreover, there have been several
high-profile cases involving counterclaims on environmental
matters involving the right to water. In Perenco v. Ecuador159 and
Burlington v. Ecuador,160 both involving parties who were partners
in an oil drilling consortium,161 a counterclaim against Burlington
for violating environmental laws and spilling oil, resulted in an
award of $41 million for Ecuador.162 In Urbaser v. Argentina,
discussed supra, Argentina filed a $190 million counterclaim
under a Spanish-Argentinian BIT based on human rights, alleging
investors had violated the right of access to water.163 Although the
counterclaim was unsuccessful, the award has paved the way
towards permitting human rights considerations as the basis of a
host state counterclaim.164
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As a generalized tool, however, counterclaims will only
address investor obligations at the margins.165 The amount of the
counterclaim will be relevant as an initial matter, as states cannot
normally have a higher claim than the claimant. Further, the state
may not have standing to bring a claim if it is not privy to the
agreement allegedly breached.166 Moreover, some states, like
Canada, have raised concerns as to whether international
tribunals are best placed to deal with counterclaims based on what
are essentially domestic legal issues.167 Whether counterclaims
are a viable option, therefore, depends very much on the
underlying jurisdictional clause, and on a complex set of fact
specific matters that will vary with the claim.
CONCLUSION
At this time of system maturation, states are using
multilateral fora and treaty processes to define new rules of
engagement in the ISDS system.
In parallel, important
developments are influencing the values and framing of the
system for the next generation. Since dissatisfaction with the
status quo has come primarily from respondents—namely host
states168—it is unsurprising that the procedural and substantive
reforms are resulting in narrower access to dispute resolution
processes and the increased policing of investor behavior.
Importantly, it also suggests that it is no longer tenable to leave
third parties who are harmed by investment projects without some
access to process and remedies.169 This is particularly relevant for
165
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indigenous peoples.170 These different vantage points of the law,
including
non-anthropomorphic
and
inter-generational
conceptions of duties, are expanding the conversation about which
duties are owed by investors, and to whom.
The terrain has become complicated. On one level, it is
possible to identify the emergence of procedural and substantive
burdens on investors, which either limit the responsibility of
states, or are factored into reducing remedies that might be owed
to investors. On a different plane, however, we see that many socalled responsibilities, are in fact conditions of access for investors
with regard to their ability to bring a claim before a particular set
of dispute resolution mechanisms.
The use of the term
“responsibility” in the context of ISDS reforms has not clarified
efforts to impose obligations on investors.171 This is because the
asymmetry in obligations is rarely understood to be a breach of an
international obligation by a subject of international law, as the
term responsibility is traditionally understood.172 The time is ripe
for this systemic evaluation of responsibility: the ISDS system is
a novel one in the international arena, with its decentralized
decision-making processes and potential for large impact on core
issues in domestic public law.
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